In this paper we study Aumann's Agreement Theorem in dynamic-epistemic logic. We show that common belief of posteriors is sufficient for agreements in "epistemic-plausibility models", under common and well-founded priors, from which the usual form of agreement results follows, using common knowledge. We do not restrict ourselves to the finite case, and show that in countable structures such results hold if and only if the underlying "plausibility ordering" is well-founded. We look at these results from a syntactic point of view, showing that neither well-foundedness nor common priors are expressible in a commonly used language, but that the static agreement result is finitely derivable in an extended modal logic. We finally consider "dynamic" agreement results, show they have a counterpart in epistemic-plausibility models, and provide a new form of agreements via "public announcements". Comparison of the two types of dynamic agreement reveals that they can indeed be different.
Introduction
In this paper we study Aumann's Agreement Theorem [1] and some of its subsequent extensions [16] and generalizations [13, 2] in dynamic-epistemic logic [5, 14] . We show that common belief of posteriors is sufficient for agreements in "epistemic-plausibility models", under common and well-founded priors, from which the usual form of agreement results follows, using common knowledge. We do not restrict ourselves to the finite case, which thus represents an improvement on known qualitative agreement theorems [2] , and show that in countable structures such results hold if and only if the underlying "plausibility ordering" is well-founded. We then look at these results from a syntactic point of view, showing that neither well-foundedness nor common priors are expressible in the language proposed in [3] , even if it is extended with a common belief operator, but we also show a finitary syntactic derivation of the static agreement result in an extended modal language. We finally consider "dynamic" agreement results. We show that "agreements via dialogues" [13, 2] have a counterpart in epistemicplausibility models, and that one also gets agreements via "public announcements", a type of belief update that has so far not been considered in the agreement literaturesee [10] and [19] . Comparison of the two types of dynamic agreements reveals that in some situations they are indeed different.
These technical results answer an "internal" question in dynamic-epistemic logic, namely whether agreement results hold in this framework, but they also offer new insights into the contribution of agreement theorems to interactive epistemology. That common belief of posteriors is sufficient for agreements, under common and well-founded priors, strengthens one of the key lessons of agreement theorems, viz. that first-order information is closely dependent on higher-order information in situations of interaction [10] . Our inexpressibility results, on the other hand, support a qualm already voiced in the literature concerning the difficulty for agents to reason about static agreements [21] . The two dynamic results not only make a sharp distinction between two forms of belief changes, they also allow one to capture more adequately the idea that agreements are reached via public dialogues. Bringing agreement theorems to dynamicepistemic logic is thus important both technically and conceptually, and it helps to bridge the existing literature on agreements with the logical approaches to knowledge, beliefs and the dynamics of information.
In this extended abstract all the proofs are omitted, as well as some auxiliary definitions. The reader interested
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Definitions
In this section we introduce the models in which we study the various agreement results, and the logical language used in [3] to describe them.
Epistemic Plausibility Models
An epistemic plausibility model [5] is a qualitative representation of the agents' beliefs as well as first-and higher-order information in a given interactive situation.
Definition 2.1. [Epistemic Plausibility Model] Given a countable set of atomic propositions PROP, an epistemic plausibility model M = W, (≤ i ) i∈I , (∼ i ) i∈I , V has W = ∅ and countable, I = {1, 2, . . . , n} is a finite set of agents, and for each i ∈ I, ≤ i is a total (plausibility) pre-order on W , ∼ i is a binary equivalence relation on W , and V : PROP → ℘(W ). An epistemic plausibility frame F is an epistemic plausibility model with the valuation V omitted.
The total plausibility pre-order ≤ i induces i's priors, and can be viewed as a qualitative counterpart to a prior probability distribution on W . If w ≤ i w we say that i considers w at least as plausible as w. Given a set X ⊆ W , we say that w ∈ X is ≤ i -minimal in X if w ≤ i w for all w ∈ X. The relation ∼ i induces i's information partition W . We write K i [w] to denote the cell of this partition {v ∈ W | w ∼ i v} to which w belongs. K i [w] should be regarded as i's (private) information at w. We write |M| = W for the domain of M.
The next two assumptions are crucial in the following. Definition 2.2. [(Local) well-foundedness] A plausibility pre-order satisfies:
• Local well-foundedness. If for all w ∈ W and i ∈ I, for all X ⊆ K i [w], X has ≤ i -minimal elements.
• Well-foundedness. If for all X ⊆ W and i ∈ I, X has ≤ i -minimal elements.
M satisfies (Local) Well-foundedness if every plausibility pre-order has the corresponding property. • For all X ⊆ W , let β i (X) = min ≤i (X) = {w : w is ≤ i -minimal in X}.
• For all w ∈ W , let
We write w
Intuitively β i (X) are the a priori most plausible elements of a set, ignoring the information partitions. B i [w] gives the states i considers most plausible, conditional on the information he possesses at w, i.e. conditional on
. The relation w → X i v maps w to all states i considers most plausible, conditional on the information he possesses at w and on a given subset X. Observe that the set {v : w → X i v} might be empty for a given w and a given X, if X ∩ K i [w] = ∅ or, in words, if X is already excluded by i's information at w.
Observe that β i is well-defined if the plausibility preorder is well-founded, while local well-foundedness is sufficient for B i to be well-defined. To draw an analogy with the probabilistic case, this means that local wellfoundedness ensures that the conditional beliefs of an agent i are well-defined for all "events" that have a nonempty intersection with the agent's information partition. Well-foundedness, on the other hand, requires i's conditional beliefs to be well-defined for any non-empty subsets of W . 
The reflexive-transitive closure of the union of the epistemic accessibility relations ∼ i for all agents i in a group G is the model-theoretic counterpart of the notion of "common knowledge" in G [15, 14] . We define "common belief" analogously. 
Doxastic-Epistemic Logic
The logical language used in [3] to describe epistemicplausibility models is a propositional modal language with three families of modal operators, which we extend here with "common belief" operators.
Definition 2.7. [Epistemic Doxastic Language] The language L EDL is defined as follows:
where i ranges over N , p over a countable set of proposition letters PROP and ∅ = G ⊆ I.
The propositional fragment of this language is standard, and we write ⊥ for p ∧ ¬p and for ¬⊥. A formula K i φ 2 92 should be read as "i knows that φ", C G φ as "it is common knowledge among group G that φ", CB G φ as "it is common belief among group G that φ." The formula B φ i ψ, should be read " conditional on φ, i believes that ψ." These formulas are interpreted in epistemic plausibility models as follows: Definition 2.8. [Truth definition] We write ||φ|| M for {w ∈ |M| : M, w φ}. We omit M when it is clear from the context.
Simple belief conditional only on i's information at a state w can be defined using the conditional belief operator:
Static Agreements and
Well-foundedness
We first show that well-foundedness is sufficient for agreement on the posteriors under common priors and common beliefs of the posteriors. More precisely, we show that if an epistemic plausibility model is wellfounded, then common belief that agent i believes that φ while j does not believe that φ implies that i and j have different priors, which is the contrapositive form of the agreement theorem.
This immediately implies the "common knowledge" agreement result below, because C G φ → CB G φ is a valid implication in epistemic plausibility models. Note, however, that this result can also have been shown independently, by application of Bacharach's [2] result on qualitative "decision functions", modulo generalization to the countable case. Well-foundeness is not only sufficient for common priors to exclude the possibility of disagreements when the posterior are common beliefs, it is also necessary, as the Proposition 3.3 shows. The model behind this result is drawn in figure 1 .
... Proposition 3.3. There exists a pointed epistemic plausibility model M, w which satisfies local well-foundedness and common prior such that M, w
Well-foundedness is thus necessary for agreement results to hold, and furthermore cannot be weakened to local well-foundedness. This condition on the plausibility ordering is thus the safeguard against common knowledge of disagreement, once we drop the assumption that the state space is finite.
Expressive Power and Syntactic Proofs
L EDL is a natural choice of language for talking about epistemic-plausibility models, and but we show here that it cannot express Theorem 3.1 nor Corollary 3.2, because it cannot express two of their key assumptions, common prior and well-foundedness. This result, which rests on the two small models drawn in figure 2, confirms the idea that to reason about (common) priors the agents must make "inter-[information]-state comparisons" [21] , which they cannot do because their reasonings in L EDL are local, i.e. they are bounded by the "hard information" [8] they have. This limitation also makes well-foundeness inexpressible, and with it the two static agreement results.
Fact 4.2.
There is no formula φ of L EDL which is true in a pointed epistemic plausibility model M, w iff Theorem 3.1 or Corollary 3.2 holds in M, w.
The syntactical counterpart of the model-theoretic agreement results thus resides in more expressive languages. In the full version of the paper we present a finite syntactic derivation of Corollary 3.
1 , which extends the hybrid language H(@, ↓, ≥ j , ∼ j ) with a common knowledge modality C G . Formally the language is the following:
Note that it allows one to scan the plausibility relation directly. The hybrid semantics draws on assignation functions that maps states variables to states and which allows the language to bind a variable to the current state and to refer to it. A detailed presentation of this language and its semantics, together with the syntactic derivation and proof of soundness of the axioms we are using is given in the full version of the paper.
On the positive side this language is able to axiomatize (converse) well-foundedness of the plausibility relation. On the negative side, the satisfiability problem for this language on the class of conversely well-founded frames is Σ 1 1 -hard [12] , ruling out any finite axiomatization of its validities. The derivation we show, however, is finite and uses only sound axioms. At the time of writing we still do not know whether the agreement results of Section 3 could be derived in a less complex language. The fact that the syntactic derivation reported here pertains to such an expressive language nevertheless shows that reasoning explicitly about agreement results requires onerous expressive resources.
Agreements via dialogues
In this section we turn to "agreements-via-dialogues" [16, 2] , which analyze how agents can reach agreement in the process of exchanging information about their beliefs by updating the latter accordingly.
Agreements via Conditioning
We first consider agreements by repeated belief conditioning. It is known that if agents repeatedly exchange information about each others' posterior beliefs about a certain event, and update these posteriors accordingly, the posteriors will eventually converge [16, 2] . We show here that this result also holds for the "qualitative" form of beliefs conditionalization in epistemic plausibility models.
We
φ otherwise. This syntactic rendering is only intended to fix intuitions, though, since in countable models the limit of this sequence exceeds the finitary character of L EDL . We thus focus on model-theoretic conditioning.
Conditioning on a given event A ⊆ W boils down to refining an agent's information partition by removing "epistemic links" connecting A and non-A states. I . Given a group G ⊆ I, the function
is a conditioning function for G whenever:
It is easy to see that the relations ∼ i in f G (A)(M) are equivalence relations. Here we are interested in cases where the agents condition their beliefs upon learning in which belief state the others are. I , ⊆ is a chain complete poset. Moreover for all A ⊆ W , w ∈ W and G ⊆ I, f G (A) is deflationary.
) as a mapping on models, it is easy to see from the preceding observation that conditioning by agents' beliefs about some event is deflationary with respect to the relation of epistemicsubmodel. It follows then by the Bourbaki-Witt fixedpoint theorem [11] that conditioning by agents' beliefs has a fixed point. Theorem 5.4 (Bourbaki-Witt [11] ). Let X be a chain complete poset. If f : X → X is inflationary (deflationary), then f has a fixed point.
Given an initial pointed model M, w and some event A ⊆ W , we can construct its fixed point under conditioning by agents' beliefs as the limit of a sequence of models, which are the model-theoretic counterpart of the dialogues described above. Definition 5.5. A conditioning dialogue about φ at the pointed plausibility epistemic model M, w, with M = W, (≤ i ) i∈I , (∼ i ) i∈I , V is the sequence of pointed epistemic plausibility models (M n , w) with
This extends to the countable case the standard representation of a dialogue about φ in the literature on dynamic agreements [16, 2] . By observation 5.3 we know that dialogues cannot last forever, i.e. that each such sequence has a limit. Corollary 5.6. For any pointed epistemic plausibility model M, w and φ ∈ L EDL there is a α f such that, for all i ∈ I, w ∈ W and α > α
Once the agents have reached this fixed-point α fpossibly after transfinitely many steps-they have eliminated all higher-order uncertainties concerning the posteriors about φ of the others, viz. these posteriors are then common knowledge: With this in hand we can directly apply the static agreement result for common knowledge (Corollary 3.2, Section 3) to find that the agents do indeed reach agreements at the fixed-point of a dialogue about φ.
Corollary 5.8 (Agreement via conditioning dialogue).
Take any dialogue about φ with common and wellfounded priors, and α f as in Corollary 5.6. Then for
This result brings qualitative dynamic agreement results [13, 2] to epistemic plausibility models, and show that agents can indeed reach agreement via iterated conditioning, even when the finite model assumption is dropped.
Agreements via Public Announcements
In this section we show that iterated "public announcements" lead to agreements, thus introducing a distinct form of information update to the agreement literature. Public announcements are "epistemic actions" [14] by which truthful, hard information is made public to the members of a group by a trusted source, in such a way that no member is in doubt about whether the others received the same piece of information as he did.
One extends a given logical language with public announcements by operators of the form [φ!]ψ, meaning "after the announcement of φ, ψ holds" [20, 17] . A dialogue about φ via public announcements among the members of a group G thus starts, as before, with i simple beliefs about φ, for all i ∈ I. The agents' beliefs about φ at the next stage are then defined as those they would have after a public announcement of all agents' beliefs about φ at the first stage. Syntactically, this gives: IB 1,i as in Section 5.1, and IB n+1,i , as
For the same reason as in the previous section, we now move our analysis to the level of models.
The A-generated submodel of a given epistemic plausi-5 bility model M is the model that results after the public announcement of A in M. We write Sub(M) = {M is the A-generated submodel of M | A ⊆ |M|} and M M whenever M ∈ Sub(M).
Definition 5.9. [Relativization by agents beliefs] Let IB i (M, w, φ) be defined as follows:
and for each i ∈ I
Note that by construction above the actual state w is never eliminated.
Observation 5.10. For any plausibility epistemic model M indexed by a finite set of agents I, Sub(M), is a chain complete poset. Moreover, for all φ ∈ L EDL , w ∈ W , !B φ is deflationary.
It follows then by the Bourbaki-Witt [11] Theorem (see previous subsection) that the process of public announcement of beliefs has a fixed point. Given an initial pointed model M, w and some formula φ ∈ L EDL , we can construct this fixed point by taking the limit of a sequence of models, which we call a public dialogue.
Definition 5.11. A public dialogue about φ starting in M, w is a sequence of epistemic-doxastic pointed models {(M n , w)} such that:
• M 0 = M is a given epistemic-plausibility model.
• (M λ ) is the submodel of M generated by β<λ |M β | for limit ordinals λ It is known that such a dialogue need not stop after the first round of announcements, in e.g. the "muddy children" case [7] , but by observation 5.10 we know that it will stop at some point.
Corollary 5.12 (Fixed-point). Given an epistemicplausibility model M 0 , w and a public dialogue about φ, there is a α φ such that (M α , w) = (M α φ , w) for all α ≥ α φ .
Moreover at M α φ , w, which we call the fixed point of the public dialogue about φ, the posteriors of the agents about this formula are common knowledge, which means that they will reach an agreement on φ if they have common and well-founded priors.
Theorem 5.13 (Common knowledge at the fixed point).
At the fixed-point of a public dialogue M α φ , w about φ, for all w ∈ W and i ∈ I, if w ∈ ||B i φ||
, and similarly if w ∈ ||B i φ|| M α φ .
Corollary 5.14 (Agreements via Public Announcements). For any public dialogue about φ, if there is common and well-founded priors then at the fixed-point M α φ , w either all agents believe that φ or they all do not believe that φ.
This new form of dynamic agreements result is conceptually important because it fits better than iterated conditioning the intuitive idea of a public dialogue, or so shall we argue in the next section, by highlighting the differences between the two processes of information exchange.
Comparing Agreements via Conditioning and Public Announcements
In this section we highlight by way of two examples that public announcements, in comparison with belief conditioning, are indeed public. We illustrate this first by comparing how conditioning and public announcements respectively change higher-order information, even in the case of "non-epistemic" facts. We then point out that this difference can indeed lead to different agreements, precisely in cases where the dialogues are about epistemic facts.
Example 5.15. Consider the model in Figure 3 . The arrows represent 1 and 2's common plausibility ordering, with w ≤ w and w ≤ w for all w, w ∈ W . The solid and dotted rectangles represent 1 and 2's information partitions, respectively. Take a proposition letter p and assume that V (p) = {w 1 , w 2 }. 
This example illustrates the public character of announcements in comparison with the private character of conditioning. In the first case all agents know that all others have received the same piece of truthful information. This is not necessarily the case for conditioning, even if all agents condition simultaneously on the same piece of information.
Given any pointed epistemic plausibility model M, w and formula φ, the reader can check that both the dialogue about φ via public announcements and the dialogue about φ via belief conditioning at M, w lead to the same agreement whenever φ is a Boolean combination of propositional letters. This is mainly due to the fact that neither operation changes the "basic facts", i.e. the propositional valuation in a given model. They do, however, treat "informational" facts differently, as the following example shows. Figure 4 . The arrows and rectangles are as in example 5.15. Take a proposition letter p and assume that V (p) = {w 1 }. Let φ := p ∧ ¬B 2 p, i.e. "p but 2 doesn't believes that p". Observe that φ holds at w 1 , that 1 believes it but that 2 does not. The conditioning dialogue and the dialogue via public announcements, both about φ, reach their fixed point n * after one round in this model, where [w 1 ] n * ,1 = [w 1 ] n * ,2 = {w 1 }. The formula φ leads to an "unsuccessful update" by public announcement [14] , and at the fixed point of the dialogue neither 1 nor 2 believe that φ. In conditioning dialogue, however, both agents do believe that φ at the fixed point.
This example hinges on the fact that public announcement and belief conditioning have a different influence on higher-order information. In conditioning the truth value of the formula under consideration remains fixed. If the formula contains epistemic (K i or C G ) or doxastic (B i , CB G ) operators, this means that the conditioning dialogue bears on the knowledge and beliefs of the agents anterior to the information exchange [3] . In dialogues via public announcements the truth value of the formula φ is dynamically adapted to the incoming new information, reflecting the fact that knowing that others receive the same piece of information might lead an agent to revise his higher-order information, too.
This highlights the public character of announcements in comparison with belief conditioning, and thus that the former fit well with the intuition of public dialogue that drives the dynamic agreement results.
Conclusion
We have studied agreement theorems from the point of view of dynamic-epistemic logic. We have shown that both static and dynamic agreement results hold in epistemic plausibility models, answering an open question in the logic literature. We pointed out the need for rather expressive logical languages to reason explicitly about static agreement results. We have furthermore improved on existing qualitative agreement results by proving that common belief in posteriors is sufficient to ensure agreement, under common and well-founded priors, and so for both finite and countable structures. Finally, we focused on the distinction between conditioning and public announcements to provide two dynamic agreement results, arguing that the later better capture the public character of dialogues. Introducing agreement theorems to dynamic-epistemic logic thus proves to be both technically and conceptually fruitful, and it bridges two important bodies of literature. 7
Future work should put the full generality dynamicepistemic logic [6, 14] to use, as well as recent developments in "softer" forms of belief updates [8, 4] , to analyze the possibility of agreements in a larger class of situations. It also remains open whether one can finitely axiomatize a logic which can derive the agreement results, in both their static and dynamic forms. Finally, two issues pertaining to the expressibility of the static agreement theorems should be investigated further: first, the definability of the common prior assumption via countable sets of formulas of L EDL , as shown by [18] for the probabilistic case; and second, expressibility of alternative agreement results, as e.g. the one provided in [21] .
